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CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON: REDEFINING SIXTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE; THE IMPACT ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
AND IN MARYLAND
1.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly one-third of American women report being physically or sexually abused by a husband or boyfriend at some point in their lives,l
while in 2003, an estimated 960,000 American children were determined to be victims of child abuse or neglect. 2 When the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Crawford v. Washington3 on March
8, 2004, it "redirected the course of admissible hearsay in light of the
[Sixth Amendment] Confrontation Clause,"4 and the Sixth Amendment became a possible source of greater protection to those criminal
defendants that are accused of committing domestic violence or abusing children. In an attempt to bring Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
back to that which the Framers had intended, the Crawford Court held
that under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, where "testimonial" evidence is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted 5
against a criminal defendant, the witness must either testify at trial or
be unavailable, and the defendant must have had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine that witness. 6
However, the Court failed to articulate a firm definition of "testimonial,"7 thereby bestowing courts across the country with the duty of
1. KAREN SCOTT COLLINS, ET AL., HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN'S LIFESPAN: THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 8
(1999), available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Healthconcerns_surveyreport. pdf.
2. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFORMATION,
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2003: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 1 (2005), http://
nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/ pubs/factsheets/ cans tats. pdf.
3. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. Allie Phillips, Weathering the Storm after Crawford v. Washington (Part 1 of 2),
UPDATE (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. Nat'l Ctr. for the Prosecution of
Child Abuse, Alexandria, Va.) (2004), http://www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/newsletters/update_volume_17_number_5_2004.html. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment
was applied to the states via the 14th Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
5. "The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.
6. [d. at 68. Some states have also codified the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, eliminating such requirements. See discussion infra
Parts I1LB. and IV., as well as notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
7. [d.
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determining exactly what constitutes testimonial evidence. Since the
Crawford Court left such questions unanswered, those courts must also
determine the extent of Crawforas impact in child and domestic abuse
cases - at least in the immediate future. The enduring impact of Crawford, however, in domestic and child abuse cases is still unknown.
In Maryland, a convicted child sex offender was granted a new trial
based on the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Crawford. 8 As a result,
the Maryland Tender Years Statute, which allows for certain health
professionals' courtroom testimony in lieu of a child abuse victim's
testimony, based on particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, is no
longer a powerful tool for child abuse prosecutors. Spurned by such
Crawford ramifications, there were initially three Victim and Witness
Intimidation bills before the Maryland legislature designed to codify
the common law rule of forfeiture, potentially making it easier for
prosecutors to again get out-of-court statements admitted against a
criminal defendant without Crawford acting as a barrier. 9 Recently, the
Maryland General Assembly codified the common law rule of forfeiture, adopting a statute that incorporates by reference Maryland Rule
5-804.10 However, the Maryland statute is more restrictive than the
federal rule, the original rule proposed by the Rules Committee, as
well as many other state's statutes. l l
Clearly, the ramifications of Crawford v. Washington extend beyond
domestic and child abuse prosecutions, yet this Comment will specifically focus on the short and long-term impacts 12 of Crawford in the
prosecution of those cases where victims repeatedly "recant and refuse
to testify, invoke a privilege, or cannot testify at trial, primarily domestic abuse and child abuse prosecutions."13
Specifically, Part II.A will discuss the pre-Crawford analysis of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. Part
Il.B will examine the Crawford decision in depth, in order to explore
the historical reasoning of the Court's decision and its exact ramifications. Part IlI.A will evaluate how courts are currently defining testi8. Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 64,867 A.2d 314 (2005).
9. See infra discussion Part IV.
lO. 6A LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL § 804(6):1
(2005 Supp.). The statute is codified as MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC.
§ 10-901 (2005). Notably, Maryland Rule 5-804 is the "corollary" to Federal
Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (6), the rule that codifies the forfei ture by wrongdoing doctrine. McLain, supra at § 804(6):1.
11. McLain, supra note 10, at § 804(6):1. See also discussion infra Part IV.
12. Terms used in Adam M. Krischer, ThoughJustice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Applying Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence
Cases, The Voice (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst.'s Violence Against Women Program, Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 2004, at 1, 2-3, available at http://
www.ndaa-aprLorg/pdf/the_voice_vol_l_issue_l.pdf.
13. Professor Lynn McLain, 'What Hath Crawford Wrought?", A Panel Discussion at the University of Baltimore School of Law 2 (Nov. 3, 2004) (transcript on file with author).
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monial under Crawford in domestic violence and child abuse
prosecutions, also specifically examining the relevant Maryland case,
Snowden v. State. 14 Part III.B will discuss a possible long-term solution
to combat the effects of the Crawford decision in domestic violence
and child abuse prosecutions: the forfeiture by wrongdoing common
law exception to the Confrontation Clause. Part IV will examine how
Maryland has codified this common law exception, and will further
argue that while this is a desirable solution in light of Crawford, Maryland's statute is too restrictive. Finally, Part V concludes that while the
exact ramifications of Crawford in domestic and child abuse cases are
not yet known, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception may prove to
be a worthy solution to admitting what is now considered testimonial
evidence.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND
Ohio v. Roberts 15

1.

"[S] ufficient 'indicia of reliability">16

Before Crawford, courts used reliability as the standard to determine
admissibility of out-of-court statements against the criminally accused.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court had to decide whether, under the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, a witness's preliminary hearing
testimony is admissible hearsay in a criminal trial if the witness is not
produced at trial. 17 Respondent Herschel Roberts was convicted of
forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. 18 In its case-in-chief, the
prosecution had relied on the preliminary hearing testimony of witness Anita Isaacs to rebut the respondent'S assertion that Isaacs had
given him the checks and credit cards. 19 While the Court recognized
the importance of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
literally "face" his or her accuser, it also noted that "competing interests ... may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial."20 In acting as a barrier to the admission of hearsay, the Roberts Court
concluded that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause instructs
that a witness be shown to be "unavailable" for cross-examination at
trial. 21 Then, the witnesses' statement is admissible only if the state14. 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 36 (2004), affd, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314
(2005).
15. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
16. [d. at 68 (quoting standard applied in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216
(1972)) .
17. 448 U.S. at 58.
18. [d. at 58, 60.
19. [d. at 59. The State relied on OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 "which permits the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who 'cannot
for any reason be produced at trial.'" [d.; See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.49 (West 1997).
20. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 (citation omitted).
21. [d. at 66.
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ment "bears [an] 'adequate indicia of reliability.' "22 The Court went
on to explain that" [r] eliability can be inferred without more in a case
"where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,"23
or upon a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."24
In reaching its holding, the Court found that Anita Isaacs' preliminary hearing testimony "bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' "25 analogous to the witness in California v. Green. 26 In Green, the Court found
that a witness's preliminary testimony was admissible even though he
was unavailable at trial because his statement had "been given under
circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical
trial. "27 Similar to the finding of admissibility in Green, the Court held
that the questioning by Roberts' counsel during the preliminary hearing "clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form," in that
counsel obviously attacked Anita Isaacs' testimony and its truthfulness. 28 Because Roberts' counsel had, and seized, the opportunity to
cross-examine Anita Isaacs, Isaacs' testimony had adequate "indicia of
reliability" and was admissible. 29

B.

Crawford v. Washington 30

1.

Before Reaching the Supreme Court: Reliability as the Standard

Although Michael Crawford's wife, Sylvia Crawford, did not testify at
his trial for assault and attempted murder, as she relied on the state
marital privilege that generally barred one spouse from testifying
against the other without the other's consent, the State was permitted
to introduce a tape of her statements to police, implicating her husband in the crime. 31 The trial court, invoking and applying Ohio v.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Roberts Court cited dying declarations, cross-examined prior trial
testimony, and properly administered business and public records as those
hearsay exceptions that "rest upon such solid foundations" that they are
"firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]." Id. at 66 n.8.
24. Id. at 66. Such "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are based on
the circumstances attendant to the making of the statement and not based
on corroborative extrinsic evidence. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820
(1990).
25. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68.
26. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
27. Id. at 165. The specific factors the court relied on were that the witness was
under oath, the respondent was represented by the same counsel at trial,
the respondent had opportunities to cross-examine the witness as to his
statements at the preliminary hearing, and the preliminary hearing was
before a tribunal and on the record. Id.
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71 (emphasis in original).
29. Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)).
30. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
31. Id. at 40. According to Washington law, even though Crawford's wife
claimed her marital privilege, the privilege does "not extend to a spouse's
out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception." Id. at 40; see
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 1995). The State, therefore,
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Roberts,32 held that Sylvia Crawford's statement bore "adequate 'indicia
of reliability'" because it was "trustworthy."33 Reversing the trial court,
the Washington Court of Appeals employed a nine-factor test to determine the trustworthiness of Sylvia Crawford's statement, ultimately
finding her statement was not trustworthy.34 The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, finding that Sylvia Crawford's
statement was trustworthy, based on its "interlocking" nature with the
defendant's statement. 35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the use of Sylvia Crawford's statement at her husband's trial violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
right. 36
2.

Supreme Court Analysis: A Historical Examination of the Confrontation Clause in England

The Court began its analysis stating that the text of the U.S. Constitution is not enough; that a thorough study of the history of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause was required in order to make a
proper ruling. 37
First examining early English law, the Court articulated that "continental civil law" was often utilized when adjudicating "the manner in

32.
33.

34.

35.

36.
37.

was able to argue the "statements against penal interest" hearsay exception
because in Crawford's wife's statements to police she admitted to facilitating the assault, and these statements indicated her husband did not stab
the victim in self-defense. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
448 U.S. 56.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). In particular, the
trial court found Sylvia Crawford's statement was trustworthy because the
statement corroborated Michael Crawford's story, she had "direct knowledge as an eyewitness," it was a description of "recent events," and a "neutral law enforcement officer" did the questioning. Id.
Id. at 41. In contrast to the trial court, the court of appeals articulated
several reasons as to why Sylvia Crawford's statements did not bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. For example, her statement
"contradicted one she had previously given [,] it was made in response to
specific questions," and she "admitted she had shut her eyes during the
stabbing." Id. Most importantly, the court of appeals held that Sylvia Crawford's statement "differed on the issue crucial to petitioner's self-defense
claim," that is, whether the victim had anything in his hand when stabbed
by Crawford. Id.
State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002). Specifically, "'when a
codefendant's confession is virtually identical [Le., interlocks] to that of a
defendant, it may be deemed reliable.'" [d. at 663 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 (Wash. 1993». Because the statements of both Michael Crawford and his wife were unclear as to whether
the victim had a weapon in his hand, the court held an "omission by both
that interlocks the statements ... makes Sylvia's statement reliable." Id. at
664.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 42-43. The Court noted that the "right to confront one's accusers is a
concept that dates back to Roman times," but the right as known and understood today dates to English common law. Id. at 43.
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which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials."38 Importantly, continental civil law "condone[d] examination in private by judicial officers."39 Justices of the Peace would often conduct civil law
examinations, which were basically, pretrial examinations of witnesses
and suspects. 40 Such pretrial examinations became routine during
Queen Mary's reign, and these examinations were commonly used as
evidence in lieu of live testimony.41
Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason in 1603 is one of the most famous uses of civil-law examination. 42 At Raleigh's trial, for purposes of
recitation to the jury, the court admitted the out-of-court examination
of, and letter written by, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham,
inculpating Raleigh.43 In response, "Raleigh argued that Cobham had
lied to save himself' and "demanded that the judges call him to appear" so he could '''[c]all [his] accuser before [his] face."'44 The
judges did not allow Lord Cobham to appear at Raleigh's trial, and
Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.45
The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh served as an impetus in England for
"statutory and judicial reforms" to English law. 46 In particular, the
courts solidified the rule that a witness must be "demonstrably unavailable to testify in person" before an out-of-court examination will be
admissible. 47 Moreover, in King v. Paine, an English court concluded
that the "admissibility of an unavailable witness's pretrial examination" hinges on whether the right of the accused to cross-examine that
witness has been satisfied. 48

3.

Supreme Court Analysis: A Historical Examination of the Confrontation Clause in the Colonies

The Crawfard Court noted that England was not the only sovereign
to employ troublesome witness examination practices. 49 As a result,
many colonial states adopted declarations of rights that guaranteed
38. [d.
39. [d. Later on, English law would adopt a "common law" approach to witness
testimony at trials, which has a "tradition ... of live testimony in court
subject to adversarial testing." Id.
40. [d.
41. [d. at 43-44.
42. [d. at 44.
43. [d.
44. [d. (quoting Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1,15-16 (1603».
45. [d.
46. [d.
47. [d. at 45.

48. [d. (citing King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (1696». "[B]y 1791 (the year
the Sixth Amendment was ratified), courts were applying the cross-examination rule even to examinations by justices of the peace in felony cases."
[d. at 46.
49. [d. at 47. For example, "[a] decade before the Revolution, England gave
jurisdiction over Stamp Act offenses to the admiralty courts, which followed
civil-law rather than common-law procedures and thus routinely took testi-
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the right to confrontation. 50 Moreover, as the right of confrontation
evolved from colonial interpretations of English common law, it became clear that confrontation was an important and highly protected
Sixth Amendment right. 51
The Crawford Court also cited the case of State v. Webb, in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that "depositions could be
read against an accused only if they were taken in his presence."52
Additionally, the majority noted that many other nineteenth century
cases affirmed the admissibility of prior testimony only if there was a
previous opportunity for the cross-examination by the accused. 53

4.

Supreme Court Analysis: Recognizing the Present Meaning of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

Adhering to its stated goal to interpret the Sixth Amendment within
the context of how the Framers viewed it, the Crawford majority determined that English and colonial history "supports two inferences
about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment."54
First, the Court articulated the inference that the "principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused."55 Specifically, notorious cases such as
Sir Walter Raleigh's served as the stimulus for the English common
law's right to confrontation and adoption of this notion by the American colonials. 56 As a result, the Crawford Court vowed to make its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment with "this focus in mind."57
The Court recognized that not all out-of-court testimony, or hearsay, triggers a Sixth Amendment analysis; for example, an "off-hand
. . . remark" might be disallowed under hearsay rules, but is not a
concern of Sixth Amendment. 58 Thus, the Court focused on the text
of the Sixth Amendment, which gives the accused a right to confront
"'witnesses,'" or, as the Court declares, those who "'bear testimony.' "59 Defining" 'testimony'" as "'a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,' "60

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

mony by deposition or private judicial examination." Id. at 47-48. Colonial
representatives protested these types of practices. Id. at 48.
Id. Notably, "[t]he First Congress ... include[d] the Confrontation Clause
in the proposal that later became the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 103 (N.C. 1794».
Id. at 50.
Id. at 42-43, 50.
Id. at 50.
See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1970) (1828».
Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 59).
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the Court concluded that the text of the Sixth Amendment, along
with its common-law historical evolution "reflects an especially acute
concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement,"61 that is, those
statements which are testimonial. 62
While the Court failed to reach an articulable definition of what
constitutes testimonial statements, it did find certain types of out-ofcourt statements unequivocally, regardless of any adopted definition,
testimonial. 63 Those statements are: ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing,64 statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations,65 grand jury testimony,66 prior trial testimony,67 and
plea allocutions. 68
Because the Crawford Court held that Sylvia Crawford's out-of-court
statement to the police officer was clearly testimonial, it stated it did
not need to further define what else is testimonial. 69 However, the
majority did refer to three possible formulations as to what constitutes
testimonial evidence. One position is that previously advocated by Justices Scalia and Thomas, defining testimonial as "'extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' "70 Arguably
more elastic is the position argued by Crawford's lawyers, that testimonial statements are "[ e] x parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine,
or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect
to be used prosecutorially."71 Finally, obviously the most flexible position is that articulated by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, defining testimonial as "statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.,,72 Nevertheless, the Court was clear in its refusal to adopt any
particular definition of testimonial.
61. [d. In distinguishing what the types of statements the right to confrontation

is concerned with, the Court emphasized that "[a]n accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not." [d.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.

71.
72.

[d.
[d. at 52, 6S.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 6S.
[d.
[d. at 64 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d lOIS, 1022 (9th Cir.

2002». This determination will be critical as the lower courts across the
country attempt to categorize evidence as testimonial or non-testimonial.
See infra Part lILA.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 6S.
[d. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992».
[d. at 51.
[d. at 52.
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The Court found that the second historically-based inference regarding the meaning of the Sixth Amendment was that "[t]he Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testifY,
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination. "73
In support of its contention that the Confrontation Clause requires
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine when determining the admissibility of testimonial evidence of witnesses absent
from trial, the Crawford majority relied upon prior case law
consistency. 74
5.

Supreme Court Analysis: Overruling Ohio v. Roberts75

While the results under preceding case law may protect the historical goals of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the majority
in Crawford definitively asserted that the Roberts test determining the
admissibility of hearsay evidence 76 is both too broad and too narrow. 77
Instead of allowing a 'jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability,"78
the Court averred that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
"commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be as73. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added). Importantly, the only exceptions to the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right are those hearsay exceptions
that existed at common law. Specifically, the majority asserted that business
records, statements by coconspirators during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, and "casual remark[s]" are "by their nature" non-testimonial. Id. at
56, 51. Regarding dying declarations, the Court chose "not [to] decide ...
whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations." Id. at 56 n.6.
74. Id. at 55-58. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980) (admitting
preliminary hearing testimony because the defendant's counsel had, and
took, the opportunity to cross-examine the witness); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (holding that because "there was an adequate opportunity" for the defendant to cross-examine the witness at the first trial, and
because the defendant "availed himself of that opportunity," the testimony
of the unavailable witness was admissible at defendant's second trial); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (excluding testimony given at a
preliminary hearing because the witness was not proven to be unavailable).
75. 448 U.S. 56.
76. The Roberts test "conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on
whether it falls under a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bears 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
77. Id. Specifically, it is too broad in that it "applies the same mode of analysis
whetFter or not the hearsay consist of ex parte testimony ... result[ing] in
close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core
concerns of the Clause." Id. Moreover, the test is too narrow because" [i] t
admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding
of reliability ... fail [ing] to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations." Id.
78. Id. at 62.
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sessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."79 To illustrate the problems of the Roberts reliability test, the
Court examined its progeny.
To begin, the Court described the reliability test as "amorphous,"
because "[w]hether a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily
on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords to each of them."80 But more importantly, the Crawford Court
found issue with the Roberts test because of its "demonstrated capacity
to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause
plainly meant to exclude."81
6.

Supreme Court Analysis: The End Result

As recognized by the Court, Crawford, in and of itself, is illustrative
of the inherent constitutional and applicability problems that arise because of the Roberts test. 82 In fact, all three Washington state courts
relied on different reliability factors to determine whether to admit Sylvia Crawford's statement. 83 Moreover, such a vague reliability standard
79. Id. at 61. In reaching this conclusion, the CrawfMd Court relied on its reasoning that" [a] dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation." Id. The right of
confrontation, is a "procedural rather than a substantive guarantee." Id.
Importantly, the Court distinguished the Roberts reliability test from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, such as forfeiture by wrongdoing, which
"extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; [because] it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability." Id. at 62. The Court's acceptance of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
hearsay exception will possibly have critical implications to the impact of
domestic and child abuse prosecutions under CrawfMd. See infra Part III.B.
80. CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63. To support its point, the Court cited the People v.
Farrell eight-factor balancing test. 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (Colo. 2001). It also
pointed to the fact that courts "wind up attaching the same significance to
opposite facts." CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63. For example, in Nowlin v. Virginia,
the court "found a statement more reliable because the witness was in custody and charged with a crime." Id. (citing Nowlin, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72
(Va. Ct. App. 2003». In contrast, in State v. Bintz, the "Wisconsin Court of
Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in
custody and not a suspect." CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63 (citing Bintz, 650
N.W.2d 913,917 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002».
81. CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 63. The Court found, for example, "accomplice confessions implicating the accused" were routinely admitted. Id. at 64. Moreover, it pointed to the admission of plea allocutions, grand jury testimony,
and prior trial testimony, as other "sorts of plainly testimonial statements"
admitted based on the Roberts test, "despite the absence of any opportunity
to cross-examine." Id. at 64-65. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d
1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (plea allocution admitted); United States v.
Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2000) (grand jury testimony admitted); State v. McNeill, 537 S.E.2d 518,524 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (prior trial
testimony admitted).
82. CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 65-66.
83. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Moreover, "[e]ach of the
courts also made assumptions that cross-examination might well have undermined." CrawfMd, 541 U.S. at 66. For example, the Washington trial
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is not what the Framers had in mind, as illustrated in their adoption of
English common law, not civil law, principles. In the Court's view,
therefore, resolving Crawford based on the Roberts reliability test would
be in conflict with the historical purpose behind the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 84
Therefore, in accordance with what the common law required, the
Court held that" [w] here testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."85 Yet, the Court
"Ie [ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' "86
Applying its articulated standard to the facts of Crawford and finding
Sylvia Crawford's statement was clearly testimonial, due to the fact that
defendant Michael Crawford had no opportunity, either at trial or
before, to cross-examine Sylvia Crawford and because she was unavailable due to marital privilege, the Court ruled that the admission of
her testimonial statement was in violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. 87
While the impact of Crawford promises to be far-reaching, two critical areas it seems to affect negatively are domestic abuse and child
abuse prosecutions, where it is common for a victim to retract previous statements and refuse to testify, invoke a privilege, or be simply
terrified to testify. In domestic abuse and child abuse cases, prosecutors must often rely on various forms of the victim's out-of-court statements as the crux of the case. 88 Now, in light of Crawford, if such
statements are deemed testimonial, and the defendant has not been

84.

85.

86.

87.
88.

court found the Sylvia Crawford statement reliable because she was an eyewitness to the crime. Id. Nevertheless, Sylvia Crawford also admitted shutting her eyes at one point. Id. Therefore, only cross-examination could
truly reveal Sylvia's true reliability as an eyewitness.
Id. at 67-68. "The Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the
reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state
courts, lack the authority to replace it with one of our own devising." [d. at
67.
Id. at 68. Notably, "[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law, ... and ... [the] exempt[ion] of such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." Id. (emphasis added). Indicating Roberts as an example, the Court seemed to imply that the
Roberts reliability test is still good law in determining the admissibility of
non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 63.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid": Applying
Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence Cases, The
Voice (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. 's Violence Against Women Program,
Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 2004, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/
pdf/ the_voice_vol_1_issue_1. pdf.
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afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the victim, all of the victim's out-of-court statements are inadmissible evidence.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Crawford's Short Term Impact: How courts are defining "testimonial"
evidence frequently used in domestic and child abuse prosecution

1.

Domestic Violence

"Domestic violence is one of the most difficult crimes to prosecute"
due to internal and external pressures on the victim and obstacles
with evidence, or the lack thereof. 89 As one South Bronx public defender stated: "[0] ne of the peculiar realities of domestic violence
cases is that - abused or not - the complaining witnesses often
don't want their loved ones prosecuted."90 In order to manage this
very issue, state prosecutors turned to "evidence based prosecution,"
whereby a "prosecutor proves his or her case with evidence other than
the victim's testimony."91
Legal professionals seem divided on the issue of whether Crawford
will have a detrimental impact on domestic violence prosecutions.
Many legal experts exhort similar arguments to those of attorney
Adam M. Krischer; that is, that the Crawford decision "threatens to remove this tool [of evidence based prosecution] from the hands of
prosecutors across the country."92 In contrast, other legal professionals assert that Crawford "should have little effect on the day-ta-day trials
seen in domestic violence courts in other [sic] states around the nation."93 In light of the divided stance of professionals, an examination
of how courts across the country are ruling on evidence typically utilized in domestic violence cases will provide the best way to assess the
impact of Crawford.
Even if the victim in a domestic violence prosecution refuses to testify at trial for the prosecution, if he or she testifies for the defense,
there is no Confrontation Clause issue. 94 This is because the victim
has made him or herself available for confrontation. 95
89. Id.
90. David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court Kills E,vidence-Based Prosecution, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2097041.
91. Krischer, supra note 88, at 1.
92. Id.
93. Amy Karan & David Gersten, Domestic Violence Hearsay Exceptions in the Wake
a/Crawford v. Washington: A View/rom the Bench, SYNERGY (Nat'l Council of
Juvenile and Family CourtJudges, Reno, Nev.), Summer 2004, at 1, 3 available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DVHearsayExceptionsWakeCrawford.
pdf.
94. See State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that even though the victim's tape-recorded statement to police was testimonial, because the victim testified at trial for the defense, her pretrial
statement was properly admitted).
95. Krischer, supra note 88, at 6.
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Calls to 911 are an extremely common form of hearsay evidence
sought to be introduced in domestic violence prosecutions. 96 In People
v. Moscat,97 the New York Criminal Court recognized that after Crawford, "the relevant inquiry ... is whether a 911 call for help is testimonial in nature."98 In answering its question, the court held that the 911
call at issue in the case was not testimonial, stating that "a 911 call for
help is not 'testimonial' in nature ... provided that it meets the requirements for an 'excited utterance' or other exception to the hearsay rule."99 The court found that the 911 call at issue was clearly an
excited utterance, therefore, non-testimonial. lOo Specifically, the call
was not generated by law enforcement or the state to seek prosecution
for a crime; rather it was initiated by a victim of a crime in need of
immediate assistance. lOI Moreover, "testimonial" contemplates that
the government sought out the witness to testify for the prosecution,
while a 911 call is a victim/witness seeking the government's help.102
Thus, the court concluded that 911 calls are clearly "not equivalent to
a formal pretrial examination" the Confrontation Clause was meant to
protect against. 103 Other courts have reached the same view as the
Moscat Court, finding that 911 calls are excited utterances and therefore non-testimonial. 104
In contrast, other courts have found 911 calls testimonial. The New
York Supreme Court, in People v. Cortes,l°5 upheld the holding of the
trial court that the 911 tape of an unidentified caller reporting an
alleged crime was clearly testimonial, based on the rationale that
96. People v. Moscat, 777 N'y.S.2d 875, 878 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (discussing
evidence used in domestic violence prosecutions, the court stated that
"[p] erhaps the most common form of such evidence is a call for help made
by a woman to 911"). See also Karan & Gersten, supra note 93, at 3.
97. 777 N'y.S.2d 875.
98. Id. at 879.
99. Id. at 880.
100. Id.
10l. Id. at 879.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 880.
lO4. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the victim's 911 call the night before her murder, indicating the defendant as the perpetrator, was non-testimonial because the victim initiated
contact with the police, sought the assistance of the police, and was not
being interrogated); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App.
2004) (The court found the assault victim's 911 telephone call was nontestimonial because it was not given in response to police interrogation or
police questioning. Moreover, the victim, not the police, initiated the 911
call to request assistance.); People v. Conyers, 777 N'y.S.2d 274, 277 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004) (The court held holding that the witness to an assault intended to call 911 to stop the assault that was in progress, not to initiate
future criminal proceedings against the defendant. Thus, the witness's
statements in her 911 call were not "testimonial;" rather, they were "excited
utterances.") .
105. 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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"[w]hen a 911 call is made to report a crime and supply information
about the circumstances and the people involved, the purpose of the
information is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use at a
judicial proceeding .... "106 Because the call was "for the purpose of
invoking police action and the prosecutorial process"107 it "is the modern equivalent, made possible by technology, to the depositions taken
by magistrates . . . under the Marian committal statute."108 Other
courts have followed the same logic set forth by the Cortes Court, finding 911 calls testimoniaI,l09
Seemingly, many courts hold that 911 calls made out of fear or a
need for immediate help and safety are not testimonial. 110 Conversely,
911 calls made with the intent to provide information about a crime
are often deemed testimonial. 11 1
Statements made to treating medical doctors are also a common
form of out-of-court hearsay evidence sought to be introduced in domestic violence prosecutions.1l 2 The status of a victim's out-of-court
statements to doctors in domestic violence prosecutions is unclear;
there are only a few cases thus far addressing the issue of statements to
medical personnel. Although the case did not involve domestic violence, a California appeals court held that a stabbing victim's statements to a doctor at a hospital were non-testimonial, therefore, even
though the victim was unavailable at trial, his statements were admissibleY3 Specifically, the court reasoned that the doctor:
was not a police officer or even an agent of the police. He
was not performing any function remotely resembling that of
a Tudor, Stuart, or Hanoverian justice of the peace. Using
[the victim's] statement to him against the defendant 'bears
little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation
Clause targeted.' 114
106. Id. at 415.
107. Id. at 416.
108. Id. at 415. Such depositions under the Marian committal statute are mentioned in Crawford by the majority as part of the history that the Confrontation Clause was meant to guard against. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 43-50 (2004).
109. See, e.g., State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (The
court held that the victim's 911 call to report the violation of a no-contact
order was testimonial in that the victim called 911 to report the incident
and describe the defendant to the operator, rather than protect herself
~rom ,~is return. Also, the call was "not 'part of the criminal incident
ltself. ).
110. Krischer, supra note 88, at 6.
111. Id.
112. Karan & Gersten, supra note 93, at 3.
113. People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Ct. App. 2004), em. granted and
depublished fly, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
114. Id. at 854 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51).
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In contrast, although the case did not involve domestic violence, a
Colorado appeals court held that the child/victim's statements about
an alleged abusive incident to a doctor were testimonial and thus
inadmissible. 115 In particular, the court reached its determination
based on the facts that the doctor:
was a member of a child protection team that provide[d]
consultations at . . . hospitals in cases of suspected child
abuse. He had previously provided extensive expert testimony in child abuse cases .... [He] elicited the statements
after consultation with the police, and he necessarily understood that information he obtained would be used in a subsequent prosecution for child abuse.116
Presently, "[s]tatements made to medical personnel appear to be
non-testimonial" if "they are made out of a desire to seek medical attention rather than in anticipation of future litigation,"117 while seemingly, "[i]f the police are already involved, so that the examination is,
in a sense, part of the investigation, then statements to [a] doctor are
testimonial."118
Lastly, statements made to police are frequently utilized as hearsay
evidence in domestic violence prosecutions.11 9 It is well established
that "statements made to police are generally deemed testimonial and
therefore require confrontation and the right to cross-examine" if
they are to be admitted as evidence. 12o However, beyond statements
garnered by the police in "interrogation-like" settings, which the Crawford Court envisions in a "colloquial" sense,121 courts have distinguished some statements made to police as non-testimonial.
In Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a murder victim's
statements to police were non-testimonial and therefore admissible
115. People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No.
04SC532, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
116. [d. Importantly, the court noted that its finding did not exclude the doctor
from testifying at pre-trial as to "his observations and physical findings." [d.
at 266.
117. Krischer, supra note 88, at 7. See also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
118. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation 10, (June 16, 2005), http://www.dwt.com/lawdir/publications/O~
05_CrawfordOutline.pdf. See also infra text accompanying note 157.
119. Karan & Gersten, supra note 93, at 3.
120. Krischer, supra note 88, at 7. The language in Crawford clearly states that
"[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are
also testimonial under even a narrow standard." 541 U.S. 36, 52. Encompassed within this analysis, some courts have found, a domestic violence
victim's application for a protective orders to be testimonial. See People v.
Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (wife's written statements in her application for a protective order against her husband/ defendant deemed testimonial); People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 (Ct.
App. 2004) (statement of declaration in support of a protective order written by victim killed via domestic violence testimonial).
121. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
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without violating the Confrontation Clause. 122 Specifically, the court
held:
First, the police did not seek her out. She went to the police
station on her own . . . [sJecond, her statements to them
were made when she was still under the stress of the alleged
assault. Any questions posed to her by the police were
presented in the context of determining why she was distressed. Third, she was not responding to tactically structured police questioning as in Crawford, but was instead
seeking safety and aid . . . Considering all of these facts in
their context, we conclude that interaction between Barnes's
mother and the officer was not structured police interrogation triggering the cross-examination requirement of the
Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the Court in Crawford. Nor did the victim's words in any other way constitute a
'testimonial' statement. Accordingly, it was not obvious error
for the court to admit the officer's testimony.123
Other courts have made similar distinctions regarding statements
made to police that are not akin to a structured police interrogation. 124
A cooperative domestic violence victim who is willing to testifY is
certainly always the preferred choice for prosecutors - even more so
today, as the victim's in-court testimony renders Crawford a moot point
at trial. However, the dilemma of unwilling victims will inevitably continue to arise in domestic violence prosecutions. And with the Court's
handing down of the Crawford decision, prosecutors must now attempt
to prove their cases within the evolving boundaries of the new law. 125
Currently, it seems as though "Crawford may make domestic violence
prosecutions more difficult, but it does not make them impossible."126

2.

Child Abuse

Similar to domestic violence prosecutions, child abuse prosecutions
may require proving the case with evidence other than the child's testimony. The type of evidence commonly used, however, can often differ from a domestic abuse case. Nevertheless, "[iJn a criminal case of
122. State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004).
123. Id. at 211-12 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (footnote omitted).
124. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856 (Ct. App. 2004) (The
court found that "Crawford strongly suggested that a hearsay statement is
not testimonial unless it is made in a relatively formal proceeding that contemplates a future trial." Therefore, the victim's statement to a police officer at the hospital, where there was no suspect, "no structured
questioning," and "no trial ... contemplated," was non-testimonial.) em.
granted and depublished by, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
125. The evidence, however, even if non-testimonial, must still pass the Ohio v.
Roberts reliability standard. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
126. Krischer, supra note 88, at 10.
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child abuse in which the child is unavailable to testify, Crawford bars
the admission of hearsay statements that are 'testimonial' unless the
defendant was afforded an opportunity of prior cross-examination of
the witness."127 An examination of how courts across the country are
ruling on the types of out-of-court hearsay evidence typically utilized
in child abuse prosecutions will best illustrate Crawford's impact, at
least in the short-term, in the prosecution of child abuse offenders.
The forensic interview 128 is a common tool utilized by prosecutors
in place of a child's testimony in an abuse case. While prosecutors will
argue forensic interviews "are not conducted primarily for the purpose of criminal prosecution"129 and are therefore non-testimonial,
courts across the country do not seem to agree. 130
Maryland had the opportunity to address the issue of out-of-court
hearsay evidence commonly utilized in child abuse prosecutions in
Snowden v. State. 131 Here, the court focused on forensic interview evidence. Specifically, the issue was whether a Maryland statute,132 that
127. Victor 1. Veith, Keeping the Balance True: Admitting Child Hearsay in the Wake
of Crawford v. Washington, UPDATE, (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. Nat'l
Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, Alexandria, Va.) (2004), available at
http:// www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/newsletters/ update_volume_16_
numbec12_2004.html. Crawford does not apply to civil protection proceedings and criminal proceedings in which the child testifies. Id.
128.
[A] forensic interview[ ] is [the] first step in most child protective services investigations, one in which a professional interviews a child to find out if he or she has been maltreated .... The
goal of the forensic interview is to obtain a statement from a child
in an objective, developmentally sensitive, and legally defensible
manner.
What is Forensic Interviewing, PRACTICE NOTES (The N.C. Div. of Soc.
Servs. and the Family and Children's Res. Program, Chapel Hill, N.C.),
Dec. 2002, available at http://www.practicenotes.org/vol8_no1/whacis.
htm.
129. Phillips, supra note 4. Prosecutor Victor Veith asserts that forensic
interviews:
[i]f done as part of a multi-disciplinary response to the possibility of abuse ... serve [] the needs of the physicians who may
treat the child, the therapists who may deal with the child's emotional needs, and the civil child protection professionals who may
seek to prevent further abuse and even work toward the preservation of the family. Although the statement may also serve the purposes of the prosecutor at a criminal trial, the interview itself is not
to focus exclusively or even primarily on the needs of investigators
or prosecutors.
Veith, supra note 127.
130. See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
131. 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 36 (2004), affd, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314
(2005).
132. Id. at 144, 846 A.2d at 39 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §11-304 (2002
& Supp. 2004)). Generally, in juvenile and criminal proceedings, this statute establishes the admissibility of out-of-court statements of allegedly sexually abused children under twelve, offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, if testified to by a physician, social worker, nurse, psychologist, or
education professional. CRIM. PROC. § 11-304.
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permitted the out-of-court hearsay statements of three child declarants through the testimony of a social worker to whom the statements
were made, violated the defendant's right to confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 133 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the forensic interview statements testified to by the social worker were testimonial because they were prepared with the explicit purpose of
developing the children's testimony for trial. 134 Because the statements were deemed testimonial, the social worker could not testify as
to the children's statements because the children were not unavailable to testify and the defendant had had no opportunity to cross-examine them. 135
Mter granting certiorari, the Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously affirmed the testimonial quality of the social worker's trial testimony as to what the children had told her in the forensic
interview. 136 In determining that the social worker's testimony was testimonial, the court found that the interview was clearly conducted
with the express purpose of prosecuting the defendant. 137 And thus,
"because [the social worker] was performing her responsibilities in
response and at the behest of law enforcement, she became, for Confrontation Clause analysis, an agent of the police department."138
Moreover, in response to other arguments asserted by the State, the
court found that neither the location of the forensic interview, the
social worker's age-appropriate demeanor in questioning the children, nor any therapeutic goals of the interview, rendered her testimony about their statements non-testimonial. 139 In concluding its
133. Snowden, 156 Md. App. 139, 152, 846 A.2d 36, 47.
134. [d. at 157, 846 A.2d at 47.
135. [d. at 157, 846 A.2d at 47. In so holding, the court effectively mooted a
portion of Maryland's Tender Years Statute, which had previously provided
for a health professional or social worker's testimony in lieu of a child
abuse victim's testimony as admissible hearsay. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 11-304(c) (2001).
136. State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64,84,867 A.2d 314, 325 (2005).
137. [d. at 85, 867 A.2d at 326. The court found the following facts pertinent:
the social worker's questioning was done after police questioning, the interview was conducted at the request of a police detective, the social worker
had the police report identifying the defendant as the abuser in her hand
while interviewing the children, and the children indicated during the interviews that they knew of the illegality of defendant's conduct. [d. at 84,
867 A.2d at 325-26.
138. [d. at 86,867 A.2d at 327. This was one of the evils that the Crawford Court
explicitly stated that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is meant
to guard against. Specifically, in Crawford, the Court stated: "[i]nvolvement
of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse - a fact borne out
time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly
familiar." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
139. Snowden, 385 Md. at 87-88, 91, 867 A.2d at 327-30. In particular, the court
found that the location of the interview, at a juvenile assessment center,
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analysis as to what makes a forensic interview testimonial, the court
stated:
[n]o matter what other motives exist, if a statement is made
under such circumstances that would lead an objective person to believe that statements made in response to government interrogation later would be used at trial, the
admission of those statements must be conditioned upon
Crawforrls requirements of unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.140
Although not a child abuse case, in the Oregon case of State v. Mack,
a social worker's interview with a three-year-old boy who was in the
house when the victim died was held to be testimonial. 141 In reaching
its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned that by taking
over the police interviews, the social worker was acting as a "proxy for
the police,"142 and her interviews were therefore "effectively indistinguishable from the ex parte examinations that Crawford places at the
heart of the Confrontation Clause protections."143 Analogous rationales and holdings appear to be the trend in determining the status of
forensic interviews in child abuse cases. 144
It is therefore probable that courts will analyze forensic interviews
by examining the status of the person conducting the interview145 and

140.

141.
142.
143.
144.

145.

provided "a controlled and structured environment for the questioning."
[d. at 88, 867 A.2d at 328. As to the nature of the social worker's questioning, the court asserted that "statements made to a sexual abuse investigator
are no less testimonial because the investigator uses non-intimidating, ageappropriate interview techniques designed to limit re-traumatization," and
furthermore, "[a]ny therapeutic motive, or effect, of [the social worker's]
involvement with the children is secondary, in terms of proper Confrontation Clause analysis, to the overarching investigatory purpose, and therefore testimonial nature, of the statements elicited during the interviews."
[d. at 88, 91, 867 A.2d at 328, 330.
[d. at 91-92, 867 A.2d at 330. The State had also attempted to argue that
Snowden did not properly preserve his objection because the children were
available in the courtroom and he did not expressly object to the state's
failure to call them. [d. at 92-93, 867 A.2d at 330-31. However, the court
refused to accept this interpretation, asserting that "Snowden's objections
to the use of the social worker's testimony properly preserved his [Sixth
Amendment] Confrontation Clause arguments for appellate review." [d. at
93, 867 A.2d at 331.
101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004).
[d.
[d. at 353.
See State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185,196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that the videotaped statements of a child's interview with a protective services worker regarding the witnessing of a domestic assault was done with
"the purpose of developing the case" against the Defendant and was therefore testimonial and inadmissible), rev'd, 696 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 2005)
(holding that the admission of the videotaped statements was harmless
error).
See, e.g., People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a "child's statement did not constitute testimonial evidence under
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the purpose of the interview. 146 Courts across the country, however,
have all found forensic interviews admissible under the Sixth Amendment if the interviewee testifies or, even in some courts, is available to
testify.147
Often, a prosecutor will want to admit the statements of a child
made to his or her parents or to a medical professional. In terms of
out-of-court statements made to parents, the Fifth Circuit of the Florida Court of Appeals, in a capital sexual battery case, held that a
child's statements to her parents were non-testimonial because they
were "spontaneous."148 Even though the child refused to testify, was
therefore unavailable at trial, and had not been previously cross-examined by the defendant, the court ruled that because her statements
were made "spontaneous [ly]" while being dressed by her mother, they
were not testimonial within the contemplation of Crawford. 149
However, in Ohio, a child victim's statements to her mother were
ruled inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause. 150 When the child began sobbing uncontrollably on the
stand, the trial court allowed the child's mother to testify as to what

146.
147.

148.
149.
150.

Crawford, and therefore was not barred by the Confrontation Clause" because "[t]he child's statement was made to the executive director of the
Children's Assessment Center, not to a government employee, and the
child's answer to the question of whether she had an 'owie' was not a statement in the nature of 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent''') (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004))).
But e! People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that the videotaped statement given by the child to the police officer in this
case was testimonial under Crawford because "the police officer who conducted the interview had had extensive training in the particular interrogation techniques required for interviewing children," and conducted the
interview in a manner indicating preparation for charges and a trial, especially by asking the child what should happen to the defendant), eert.
granted in part, No. 04SC532, 2004 Colo. WL 2926003(Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
See also supra note 138 and accompanying text and supra text accompanying
note 142.
See supra notes 137, 139 & 144 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Colo. 2004)
(holding that "[b]ecause the admission of prior out-of-court statements
made by a witness who is testifying at trial and is subject to cross-examination does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation ... the videotaped statements of both children are admissible."); Somervell v. State, 883
So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the videotaped forensic interview of an eight-year-old boy was properly admitted at trial
against the defendant because the boy "was not only available to testify, he
did in fact testify, and [the defendant] ... had a full and complete opportunity to confront and cross-examine him"); Starr v. State, 604 S.E.2d 297, 299
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that videotaped interview with the victim did
not violate the Confrontation Clause and was admissible because although
the victim did not testify, the record showed "she was available for crossexamination") .
Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
[d. at 67, 69.
State v. Harr, 821 N.E.2d 1058, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

2005]

Redefming Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence

153

the child had told her under the "excited utterances" hearsay exception. 151 On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the mother's statements because the child victim's statements to her mother "were given nearly
two weeks after the startling event ... after the child was confronted
by her mother for disobeying her order not to enter a stranger's apartment, and only after she interrogated the child with leading questions."152 While the status of out-of-court statements to parents seems
to hinge on the spontaneity of the statement, it is worth noting that
out-of-court statements made to parents by children will seemingly be
admissible if the child is available to testify with an opportunity for
cross-examination afforded to the defendant. 153
In a case concerning a child sexual abuse victim's statements to a
medical professional, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the
four-year-old victim's statements to her doctor were for the sole purpose of obtaining medical treatment and therefore non-testimonial. 154 The court reasoned that "the victim was taken to the hospital
by her family to be examined . . . . [t]here was no indication of a
purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of
government involvement in the initiation or course of the examination."155 However, in the case of In re T.T., the Illinois appellate court
refused to admit a doctor's testimony as to the child abuse victim's
identification of the defendant because such statements dealing with
"fault or identity" ... "implicate[d] the core concerns protected by the
confrontation clause."156 Similar to domestic abuse cases, it seems as
though a child abuse victim's statements will be deemed testimonial if
made when medical personnel are involved with a police investigation
or if made with the purpose of identifYing the defendant as the perpe-

151. Id. at 1059-60, 1064.
152. Id. at 1067.
153. See State v. McClanahan, No. 50866-1-1, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 597, at *1,
*11-13 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2004) (holding that a child's statements to
her mother were admissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause because the child/victim had testified).
154. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004). See also, People v. Cage,
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854-55, (Ct. App. 2004) (holding statements to a doctor could not be expected to be used in a prosecution so were not testimonial)), cm. granted and depublished by, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
155. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d at 291.
156. 815 N.E.2d 789, 803-04 (III. App. Ct. 2004). The court, however, did find
that the child abuse victim's statements regarding all physical symptoms do
not violate the Confrontation Clause and are admissible. Id. See also People
v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that a finding
that a child's statements to a doctor were testimonial does not require the
exclusion of testimony by the doctor regarding his observations and physical findings), cm. granted, No. 04SC532, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec 20,
2004).

154

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

trator, whereas statements made to medical personnel merely describing physical symptoms are deemed non-testimonial. l57
Finally, it is not unusual for a child abuse victim to exhibit poor
memory or freeze, or both, during his or her trial testimony. The issue
then becomes whether just by virtue of being on the stand at trial, the
child's out-of-court statements to others are admissible. Although still
uncertain, recent Crawford case law addressing this scenario indicates
that "[p]rovided that the child takes the witness stand and is subject to
cross-examination, the child's lack of memory regarding [his or her]
prior statements does not bar the admission of those hearsay statements (including statements made during a forensic interview) ."158
For example, in People v. Harless, the California Court of Appeals
held that a child victim's partial memory loss on the stand did not
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation right. 159
Based on the Supreme Court's exact language in Crawford,160 the California court found that the victim's
partial failure of recollection did not prevent her from explaining her prior statements, or preclude the jury from assessing her demeanor and determining whether her prior
statements or her trial testimony was more credible. Accordingly, defendant had the opportunity for effective cross-examination .... 161
157. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 112-18
and accompanying text.
158. Phillips, supra note 4. See also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
In Owens, a correctional officer was violently attacked with a metal pipe. [d.
at 556. At trial, the officer testified that he remembered being visited by an
FBI agent and identifying the defendant as the assailant. [d. However, on
cross-examination, the officer admitted he did "not remember seeing [his]
assailant," did not remember any other visitors during his hospital stay, and
further, could not recall whether he had any visitors suggest that the defendant was the assailant. [d. Defense counsel appealed, alleging, in part, that
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause prohibits "testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis of the identification." [d.
at 555. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation was not violated, stating, "[w]e do not think that a
constitutional line drawn by the Confrontation Clause falls between a witness's forgetful live testimony ... and the introduction of the witness's earlier statement. ... " [d. at 560.
159. 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 109 P.3d 68 (Cal.
2005).
160. The specific portion of the Crawford decision states:
we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the
use of his prior testimonial statements .... The Clause does not bar
admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial
to defend or explain it.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citations
omitted).
161. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637.
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Another California case has set forth similar results. 162
However, when a child victim takes the stand but refuses to testify
regarding the alleged incident, if the defendant has had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the child, all of the child's testimonial will
be deemed inadmissible in violation of the Confrontation Clause. 163
As an Illinois court noted, "[c]hild sexual abuse cases present special
problems where the child victim may be unable to testify adequately
due to fear, guilt, or intimidation."164 Thus, even though the child
victim is declared unavailable, the defendant is also often precluded
from cross-examination; therefore, under Crawford, critical out-ofcourt statements regarding abuse will be inadmissible.
Ideally, analogous to a domestic abuse victim, a willing and able
child's testimony makes Crawford a moot point for prosecutors. In reality, a significant amount of what is now called testimonial evidence,
once undoubtedly admissible in a child abuse prosecution (i.e. forensic interviews), must, at least for now, meet a more exacting, yet still
unstable, Crawford admissibility standard. 165
B.

Foifeiture by Wrongdoing: An Enduring Solution?
The defendant who has removed an adverse witness is in a
weak position to complain about losing the chance to crossexamine him. And where a defendant has silenced a witness
through the use of threats, violence or murder, admission of
the victim's prior statements at least partially offsets the perpetrator's rewards for his misconduct. 166

162. People v. Phan, No. H025002, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5047, at *1314 (Ct. App. 2004) (The court held that because a child victim testified at
trial, even though she had poor recollection concerning statements she
made to an investigating police officer, Crawford was satisfied with the police officer's testimony regarding the child's statements because the victim
testified and was subject to cross-examination. The fact that the victim had
poor memory and was not able to be fully cross-examined did not require
reversal.) .
163. E.g., In Re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
164. Id. at 797. However, some courts are now making the argument that if the
defendant has made the child unavailable, he or she may have forfeited his
or her right to confront the children. See infra Parts IlLB., IV.
165. But see supra notes 85 & 125 and accompanying text (discussing the continued use of a reliability standard for non-testimonial evidence). AJso, it is
important to recognize that
[e]ven though the confrontation right [may] no longer appl[y],
the courts hold that the due process clause of the Constitution still
applies, so that evidence that is unreliable on its face will be excluded. This guarantee is achieved in the federal courts through
the application of Federal Rule 403 (identical to Maryland Rule 5403).
Letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty
Fellow, Univ. of Bait., Sch. of Law, to DelegateJoseph F. Valiario,Jr., Chair,
Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 15, 2005) at 5 (on file with author).
166. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Today, courts across the country are virtually, on a case-by-case basis, determining the definition of testimonial in domestic and child
abuse cases. As a result, prosecutors must argue, on a case-by-case basis, that evidence typically utilized in domestic and child abuse cases is
not excluded by Crawford. And the admissibility of that evidence, discussed supra, is still being resolved by the courts.
As a result, domestic and child abuse prosecutors, legislators, law
professors, and other legal professionals are also advocating for an
enduring solution to such evidentiary problems spurned by Crawford.
That solution asserts the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception to as many domestic violence and child abuse cases as possible, thereby precluding a Crawford analysis to determine the admissibility of a victim's out-of-court hearsay statements offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.
In 1878, the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced the
rule of forfeiture, a specific exception to a defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. 167 While the Court acknowledged a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be "confronted with
the witnesses against him," it went on to assert that "if a witness is
absent by [the accused's] own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that
which he has kept away."168 Although Crawford has since altered Confrontation Clause analysis, the Court made a distinct point of upholding the rule of forfeiture in its opinion. 169 Explicitly, the Court stated
the rule of forfeiture is one which it still "accept[sJ," as it "extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds .... "170
"In other words, defendants should not profit from their own bad
acts."171
The rule of forfeiture, therefore, "should allow prosecutors to get a
significant number of out-of-court statements of unavailable witnesses
167. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). The "Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), ... codified the common law forfeiture doctrine for
the federal courts in 1997." Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph Vallario,
Jr., supra note 165, at 3.
168. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158. The Court developed its analysis further, going on
to state:
The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person
against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts. It
grants him the privilege of being confronted with witnesses against
him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist
on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement,
their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition
to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated.
Id.
169. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
170. Id.
171. Krischer, supra note 88, at 3.
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admitted."172 Already, since Crawford, some state courts have applied
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception when a defendant's conduct
has resulted in a witness being unavailable to testify. I n The Supreme
Court of Kansas, for example, held that the victim's statement identifying the defendant as the shooter, made before the victim died, was
admissible under Crawford because the defendant "forfeited his right
to confrontation by killing the witness." I 74 Similarly, in People v. Moore,
the Court of Appeals of Colorado held that the dead victim's out-ofcourt statement, implicating the defendant in prior acts of domestic
violence, was admissible under Crawford, as there was "no dispute that
the victim was unavailable to testify because of her death and that her
death was the result of defendant's actions."175 Thus, the court concluded "that [the] defendant forfeited his right to claim a confrontation violation in connection with the admission of the victim's
statements into evidence."176
In addition to homicide prosecutions, some legal professionals argue that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception argument logically
extends to the admission of the out-of-court hearsay statements of domestic violence and child abuse victims.

1.

"Forfeiture by Domestic Violence"177

The domestic violence problem in this nation is astounding. As the
Supreme Court recognized, "[a] n estimated 4 million American wo172. Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington "F(JTfeiture by Wrongdoing"
Confrontation Clause Axception in Child Abuse Cases, REAsONABLE EFFORTS
(Am. Prosecutors Research Inst. Nat'l Child Prot. Training Ctr., Alexandria, Va.) (2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/newsletters/reasonable_efforts_ volume_l_number_3_2004.html.
Notably,
"[a]ll of the federal courts ... and the District of Columbia" apply Rule
804(6), the Federal Rule of Evidence codifying the common law rule of
forfeiture. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph Vallario,Jr., supra note 165,
at 3.
173. See, e.g., infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. "At a minimum, the
following states, as well as the District of Columbia, have rules, statutes, or
case law explicitly adopting the [common law forfeiture] doctrine: Arizona, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas." Letter from Lynn
McLain, to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 3.
174. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004).
175. People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1,5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
176. [d. at 5. See also People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846-47, 851 (Ct. App.
2004) (finding statements of the deceased victim, told to a police officer in
a previous altercation admissible, because the court found that the defendant forfeited his right to cross-examine the victim due to his admitted
wrongdoing in killing the victim), cert. granted and opinion superseded by, 102
P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); Francis v. Duncan, No. 03 Civ. 4959 (DC), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16670, at *54-58 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,2004) (The court held that
the defendant forfeited his right to confront the victim because he had
called her with death threats. Thus, the victim's grand jury testimony was
admissible at trial, as were her statements regarding her fear of dying.).
177. Term adopted from Krischer, supra note 88, at 3.
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men are battered each year by their husbands or partners."178 Even
more horrific is data illustrating that domestic violence is not normally a one-time occurrence. 179 And even if an abused woman attempts to leave her abuser, one study reveals that of those women that
seek medical aid, seventy-three percent were injured after leaving their
abuser. I80 Moreover, even if a woman is brave enough to attempt to
prosecute, sadly, the involvement of the criminal justice system is oftentimes not enough to prevent further abuse. 18I
While no one wants to witness a battered woman suffer additional
harm, the trend of an abuser to continue some sort of abuse, even
after the criminal justice system is involved, can now perhaps work to
the benefit of prosecutors. After Crawford, prosecutors might potentially use the abuser's continued harassing, threatening, or violent behavior to convict the abuser without the testimony of the woman
victim and in full compliance with the Sixth Amendment.
The "Quincy Probation Project, which tracked court restrained
male abusers," found that almost half of the victims were threatened
with physical violence by their abusers if they continued cooperation
with prosecutors.1 82 Not all abusers use physical threats, however, as
the Project reported that "[£1orty-two percent of victims reported economic threats and [twenty-five] percent were threatened with the loss
of their children."183 Physical evidence of threats of bodily harm, economic harm, and harm to the victim's children can be captured by
prison phone records, e-mail.mail. caller ID logs showing numerous
phone calls, or other witnesses who can "testify as to the content of
specific threats made by the defendant ... [to] the victim."184 PostCrawford, that evidence can be used to show the victim-witness's unavailability due to the defendant's unlawful procurement. "In short,
prosecutors should be on the lookout for evidence that supports the
argument that a defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation by
his own wrongdoing."185
178. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-395,
§ 331 (a)(l) (1993) (citing Council on Scientific Affairs, American Med.
Ass'n, Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267 J. AM.
MED. AsS'N 3184,3185 (1992))).
179. Linell A. Letendre, Notes and Comments, Beating Again and Again and
Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of
Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REv. 973, 977-78 (2000).
180. Id. at 980 (citing SUMAN KAKAR, DOMESTIC ABUSE: PUBLIC POLIcy/CRIMINAL
JUSTICE APPROACHES TOWARDS CHILD, SPOUSAL AND ELDERLY ABUSE 37
(1998)). Kakar cites the National Crime Survey which shows that 48% of
domestic violence assaults go unreported. Kakar, supra.
181. Krischer, supra note 88, at 3.
182. Id. (citing EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 88 Games Inciardi ed., 2nd ed. 1996)).
183. Id. (citing Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 182, at 88-89).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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In some cases, there may be no physical evidence of a defendant's
unlawful procurement. In such situations, the victim is already so traumatized, threatened, or both, by her abuser's past behavior that by the
time the criminal justice system is involved, the abuser need not do
anything else to procure the victim's unavailability.186 In the context
of child abuse prosecutions, Tom Harbinson, Senior Attorney at the
National Child Protection Center of Winona State University, argues
that" [a] common act of procurement is procurement of unavailability by trauma."187 Like abused children, battered women have also
been shown to suffer from severe trauma. 188 The former director of
the Center for Applied Conflict Management at Kent State University
stated, "[ t] he growing body of research on the psychological and physiological effects of chronic trauma such as battering suggests that the
harm to victims is even more complex than previously understood."189
For example, "almost half of victims of battering and sexual assault
meet the criteria for PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] ."190
Yet, PTSD is an after-effect of acts committed during a crime that
has already occurred, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on
whether the rule of forfeiture applies to procurements made during
the crime. 191 However, the underlying principle of the rule of forfeiture supports its application to procurements during the crime. 192 As
Harbinson explains, "[T]he critical wrongdoing the [forfeiture] exception attempts to prevent is not based on when the act occurs, but
whether the act caused a witness to be unavailable."193 This argument
succeeded in New Jersey, where the New Jersey Superior Court ruled
that because the accused, while committing the abuse, threatened to
kill his victim if she reported the abuse, he had forfeited his right to
confront her in court. 194 Prosecutors can thus argue that the trauma
preventing a victim from testifying later at trial was directly caused by
the past abuse inflicted by the abuser. Consequently, the abuser has
thus forfeited his right to confront the victim.
2.

"Forfeiture by Child Abuse"195

There are few crimes in this country more atrocious than child
abuse. The number of child abuse or neglect victims reached
186. [d.

187. Harbinson, supra note 172.
188. Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face of Domestic
Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM. & COUNCILIATION CTS.
REv. 335, 341-43 (1999).
189. [d. at 341.
190. [d.
191. Harbinson, supra note 172.
192. [d.
193. [d.

194. State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1345-49 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
195. Term adapted from Krischer, supra note 88, at 3.
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1,054,000 (fifteen of every one thousand children) in 1997. 196 Before
Crawford, most states had child hearsay statutes that were "over-inclusive," allowing for the admission of child hearsay, "not tested by crossexamination," even if the child did not testify at trial. 197 Mter Crawford, as discussed supra, a child's out-of-court hearsay statement mayor
may not be admissible. 198 In order to combat such a tenuous standard,
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause
may be the long-term solution child abuse prosecutors need to combat the effects of Crawford.
Tom Harbinson asserts
It is common in child abuse cases for the suspect to procure
the child's unavailability to testify whether by telling the
child not to tell; by threatening the child, the family, or even
pets; or by procurement through use of others, such as family members.199

In doing so, the abuser is attempting to "prevent the child from disclosing and testifying against the abuser."200 These actions arguably
constitute a forfeiture of the defendant's right to confront his accuser,
because the defendant has procured the witness's unavailability.
Moreover, Harbinson argues that prosecutors should use the language "or the acts of the accused" as set forth in Motes v. United
States,201 to "argue the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to as many
acts as possible."202 Specifically, Motes held that depositions not subject
to cross-examinations and not taken under oath would violate the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause unless the witness was "absent from the trial by suggestions, procurement, or the acts of the
accused."203 These acts include, in addition to threatening the child
or a family member, "[t]hings the child could view as being beneficial,
196. Andrea Charlow, A Minnesota Comparative Family Law Symposium: Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 763, 766 (2001) (citing NATIONAL
COMMITTEE TO PREVENT CHILD ABUSE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATISTICS (Apr. 1998), http://www.childabuse.com/facts97.html) .
197. Jean Montoya, Child Hearsay Statutes: At Once Over-Inclusive and Under-Inclusive, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 304, 309-11 (1999).
198. See generally Harbinson, supra note 172 (discussing the lack of a "comprehensive definition of testimonial statements" from the Supreme Court in
Crawford and possible ways to handle out-of-court hearsay statements of
child abuse victims).
199. Harbinson, supra note 172 (footnotes omitted) (citing various cases as examples including State v. Bewley, 68 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
(defendant told child victim he would kill him if he refused to submit to
sex or told anyone); State v. Nanucke, 829 S.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Mo. 1992)
(four-year-old sodomy victim was told she and her mother would be killed if
she told anyone about the abuse)).
200. Harbinson, supra note 172.
201. 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900).
202. Harbinson, supra note 172.
203. Motes, 178 U.S. at 471.
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such as gifts or money, should constitute procurement if they result in
the child being unavailable."204
However, asking a child not to tell, threatening the child (or family
member) if he or she tells, or using gifts to ensure a child's silence
often occur during the abuse. As stated previously, the Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on whether the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception
applies to wrongful procurement made during the crime. 205 Yet, the
purpose behind the forfeiture rule, (the removal ofa defendant's confrontation rights if he causes a witness to be unavailable), supports
applying the rule to procurement during the crime. 206 Thus, Harbinson asserts that "[i]f the accused's acts are responsible for . . . the
child refus[ing] to testifY, stating she cannot remember, or
be com [ing] non-responsive, the requirement of unavailability should
be considered to be met."207 And, therefore, the "State should be allowed to show, in a pre-trial hearing, it has made a good faith effort to
have the witness testifY," but the child witness is not required to be
called at trial because the defendant has wrongfully procured the
child's unavailability.208
Additionally, Harbinson argues that wrongful procurement can
make a child "unavail[able] by trauma."209 "It is widely accepted that
[abused] children can have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Acute
Stress Disorder, or Traumatic Stress Disorder."21o In order to assert
the argument that the defendant has forfeited his confrontation right,
he suggests having a prosecutor "talk[] to family members, caretakers, teachers, the child ... , and perhaps [make] a referral to a child
clinical psychologist" to determine if the defendant's acts caused the
"trauma that renders [the] child unavailable to testifY."211 Instead of
allowing a defendant to argue that the child merely "froze" because of
his or her young age, therefore barring the child's out-of-court hearsay statements under Crawford, the argument becomes that "the acts of
the accused ... constitute[d] procurement by trauma."212
IV.

FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING: THE MARYLAND VERSION

While the common law rule of forfeiture was codified by Rule
804(b )(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,213 and is therefore available to be utilized as a valid argument for the admissibility of testimonial evidence for federal prosecutors after Crawford, not all states have
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Harbinson, supra note 172.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See Harbinson, supra note 172.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968».
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 172.
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adopted the federal rule or some form thereof. 214 Consequently, domestic and child abuse prosecutors in those states are left without the
ability to argue statutory forfeiture by wrongdoing.
It was only just recently that Maryland became one of the states to
codify the common law doctrine of forfeiture bywrongdoing.215 Originally, the Maryland General Assembly had three Victim and Witness
Intimidation bills before it, all of which contained the same specific
hearsay provision: in a judicial proceeding, a "statement . . . is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered against a party
that has engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit wrongdoing
that was intended to and did procure the unavailability of the declarant of the statement."216 In other words, criminal defendants could be
found to have waived their Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
right if they, either by their own doing or through a third person,
intentionally attempt to keep, (or succeed in keeping) or comply with
a plot to keep, a witness from testifying against them. 217
Recently, however, the Maryland General Assembly "codified a
more restrictive [forfeiture by wrongdoing] rule," which became applicable October 1, 2005 and is only pertinent to criminal proceedings. 218 And "[o]n June 24, 2005, the Rules Committee revised its
proposal to incorporate the new statute by reference and to apply the
Committee's own version to civil proceedings."219
Practically, under the Maryland statute, just as was proposed in the
aforementioned bills, before a testimonial hearsay statement can
come in under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, it has to pass
214. But see supra note 173.
215. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
216. GUY G. CHERRY, DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.D. 248,
2005 Leg., 420th Reg. Sess., at 2 (Md. 2005). As Professor Lynn McLain
explains:
The bills simply codify the common law (and common sense)
doctrine that a party whose misconduct causes the inability of a
witness to testify live in court forfeits the right to object on the
ground that the party cannot cross-examine the witness. Put simply: If you created the situation, you can't complain about it. If
you make the witness unavailable, you can't complain that you
can't cross-examine the witness. To provide otherwise would be to
let the intimidator/murderer profit from his own wrongdoing.
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario,Jr., supra note 165, at l.
See also S. 122, 420th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005) (changing the
seriousness of and altering the penalties for witness intimidation crimes)
and S. 188, 420th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005) (providing forfeiture
exception to hearsay rule in felony controlled dangerous substance case or
case involving crime of violence).
217. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation only applies to criminal defendants. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
218. McLain, supra note 10, at § 804(6):1 (emphasis added).
219. Id. "The court of appeals has not yet considered either of the Committee's
proposals." Id.
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through a number of stages. 220 To begin, ajudge must find that the
witness (or victim) who made the statement is really unavailable to
testify.22I Next, ajudge must find that the defendant's misconduct, or
the defendant's direction of, or conspiracy to commit misconduct,
procured the inability of live witness testimony.222 Finally, a judge
must determine that the defendant had the intent of causing the witness's unavailability through his misconduct, "and as reflected in (1)
and (2) above, that this misconduct had the intended effect."223 Additionally, even if the statement satisfies these three steps, the judge
must then find that had the witness appeared to testify, he or she
would have been permitted to testify to the facts contained in his or
her statement and that the statement satisfies the reliability standard,
mandated by the Constitution's guarantee of due process. 224
220. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 3.
221. Id. at 4. "The grounds for unavailability are exactly the same in Maryland
courts as in federal courts, under Maryland Rule 5-804 and Federal Rule
804. They are well defined in the case law, which establishes the constitutional requirements for meeting these criteria." Id.
222. Id. Professor McLain explains:
[B]oth the statute and the proposed Rule make clear that they
will not make admissible statements of a witness who is not testifying for some reason other than because the opposing party's
wrongdoing caused the witness' unavailability. The wrongdoing
must be tied to that party: the party will be responsible for his or
her own actions, or the actions of others which he or she 'directed'
or in which he or she 'conspired.' Where insufficient proof is provided to tie the wrongdoing to the opponent of the evidence, the
statute (or Rule) will not be available to the proponent.
McLain, supra note 10 at § 804(6):1. But c! "Where insufficient proof
is provided to tie the wrongdoing to the defendant, the Rule will not be
available to the prosecution." Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario,Jr., supra note 165, at 3. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda, 208 F. Supp.
2d 619, 624 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2001) (finding that because the witness "maintained that fear of [the defendant] had nothing to do with his decision not
to testify" and because it was not clear the defendant had caused the witness' unavailability, the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception was not
applicable) .
223. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 4.
"The [statute's] language, on this point, like that of the federal rule, is in
fact narrower than that of the common law doctrine in California, Colorado, Kansas, and Texas." Id. See e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603,
611 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that the rule of forfeiture applies "whether
or not the defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at the time he committed the act that rendered the witness
unavailable") .
224. Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 5.
Professor McLain explains:
[Other jurisdictions'] case law shows, without exception, that
the judge will be required to exclude the evidence if it appears that
the evidence is irrelevant (Md. Rules 5-401 and 5-402), or the witness had no first-hand knowledge (Md. Rule 5-602), or the witness
was engaging in conjecture or speculation (Md. Rules 5-701 and 5702), or for other reasons the statement is so unreliable that its
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While the standard of proof for admissibility of testimonial hearsay
statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception was a preponderance of evidence, the statute requires the application of the
clear and convincing evidence to the three steps discussed supra. 225
Specifically, the judge will hear testimony, outside of the hearing of
the jury, as to all of the preliminary facts that go to prove the witness'
unavailability and the defendant's intentional wrongful procurement
of the witness, and will then decide whether the statement is
admissible. 226
Before codification, Professor McLain was a committed advocate of
the aforementioned Witness Intimidation Bills. For example, in a letter to the Chair of the Maryland House Judiciary Committee, Professor McLain argued that merely increasing the penalty will not solve
Maryland's witness intimidation problems because" [p]rosecution of
an intimidator is not as effective as obtaining a conviction on the original, underlying crime."227 If a defendant succeeds in keeping a witness
from testifying, he is then likely only facing prosecution of witness intimidation charges, and has succeeded in avoiding prosecution for the
underlying crime. Moreover, Professor McLain asserted that "[t]he
heart of these bills is the hearsay provision [forfeiture by wrongdoing], which makes witness intimidation ineffective, in that it will no
longer achieve the intimidator's goal, to escape punishment for the
original crime."228 Thus, as long as defendants know that the procurement of a witness's unavailability will secure their ability to keep out

225.
226.

227.
228.

admission would cause unfair prejudice to the party who caused
the witness to be unavailable (Md. Rule 5-403).
[d. See also supra notes 85 & 125 and accompanying text.
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165, at 8-9.
McLain, supra note 10 at §804(6):1.
McLain, supra note 10 at § 804(6):1. Interestingly, while public defenders
and defense attorneys seem to favor a clear and convincing standard of
proof, Professor McLain notes that the Federal Rules clearly reject a clear
and convincing evidence standard. She points out that:
[t]he federal Advisory Committee Note states: "[t]he usual
Rule 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard has been
adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule 804(b) (6) seeks to
discourage." Because witness intimidation and murder "strikes at
the [very] heart of the ... [criminal] justice [system]," we do not
want to protect those who engage in it by shielding them with a
higher burden of proof than that which applies generally to other
preliminary facts of admissibility, including all other hearsay
exceptions.
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr. supra note 165, (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(6); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001)
(adopting the preponderance of the evidence standard when determining
whether a defendant waived his right to object to evidence based on his
involvement in the procurement of the witness' unavailability).
Letter from Lynn McLain to Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., supra note 165 at 1-2.
[d. at 2.
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that witness's previous testimonial statement implicating them (under
the Sixth Amendment as explicated in Crawford:), they will have "a
great incentive to engage in intimidation, or even murder, of
wi tnesses. "229
However, according to Professor McLain, the statute currently in
force in Maryland codifying the common law forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine "is far narrower than both the federal rule and the Rules
Committee's original proposal in" three critical ways.230 To begin,
"the Maryland statute is restricted so as to apply only to trials for certain crimes: those involving either drug distribution ('felonious violations of Title 5 of the Criminal Law Article') or those that qualify as
'crimes of violence as defined in 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article.' "231 Professor McLain explains that "the latter category does not
include crimes of physical child abuse, even if resulting in serious
physical injury; sexual child abuse; sex offenses in the third or fourth
degree (including so-called 'statutory rape'); or second degree assault
(which is often charged in domestic violence cases) ."232 Also, the statute provides that the other Maryland Rules will be "strictly applied."233
Professor McLain argues that "[a]s it is obviously unlikely that an intimidated (or murdered) witness will appear in court to testify to the
intimidation ... this provision will create an insuperable catch-22 for
the proponent of the evidence .... "234 Finally, the statute utilizes the
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof at this preliminary
stage, clearly departing from Maryland case law. 235
V.

CONCLUSION

The impact Crawford v. Washington will have on domestic and child
abuse prosecutions will not be fully realized until well into the future.
In the interim, prosecutors are left to litigate the non-testimonial nature of evidence that may now, under Crawford, pose a question as to
admissibility. While one court may find a call to 911 testimonial, another court, based on differing facts and analyses, may find a call to
911 non-testimonial. 236
Domestic and child abuse prosecutors must learn how to use the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception effectively. In domestic abuse
cases, prosecutors should continue teaching courts about the enduring effects of domestic violence, and thus argue that domestic vio229. Id.
230. McLain, supra note 10 at §804(6):1. Includes a discussion of how "[t]he
statute also contains three differences from the federal rules that are
shared by the Rules Committee's proposal[ ]."
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. See also supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
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lence inherently creates a victim's unavailability.237 In child abuse
cases, prosecutors must attempt to build a strong case by educating
themselves, as well as all potential persons who are involved in a
child's life and those who will become involved upon allegations of
abuse, regarding acts or words that may illustrate unlawful procurement of the child's unavailability.238 Then, they must convince the
courts that the defendant procured the child's unavailability.
As a long-term solution, prosecutors, law professors, and other interested parties must advocate for the use of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception as a method to ensure the admissibility of
out-of-court statements made by victims and witnesses. 239 While Maryland has codified the common law doctrine of forfeiture, the current
statute is inadequate. It is thus important for all of those interested in
successful domestic and child abuse prosecutions to lobby for modifications to this statute, allowing for more crimes to fall under its provisions, a less strict application of the Maryland Rules of evidence, and a
lower burden of proof.
Nevertheless, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception has the potential to prove to be an effective tool for child and domestic abuse
prosecutors. It is now up to prosecutors and those interested parties in
the legal community and beyond to convince the legislatures to enact
effective codifications of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, and to
convince the courts that the same is a legally sound evidentiary
argument.

Tracey L. Perrick*

237. Krischer, supra note 88, at 10.
238. Harbinson, supra note 172.
239. See supra Parts III.B and IV.
* J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law. Thank you
to Professor Lynn McLain, for her invaluable insight and guidance.

